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‘‘Hope, Danger’s Comforter’’: Thucydides,
Hope, Politics
Joel Alden Schlosser

Deep Springs College

With its ascendancy in American political discourse during the past few years, hope has become a watchword of
politics, yet the rhetoric has failed to inquire into the actual function of hope in political life. This essay examines
elpis, the Greek word for ‘‘hope,’’ in Thucydides’ History and offers a theoretical account of this concept and its
connection to successful political action. I suggest that a complex understanding of hope structures Thucydides’
narrative: Hope counts as among the most dangerous political delusions, yet it also offers the only possible response
to despair. Thucydides’ text educates the judgment of his readers, chastening hope while showing its importance
despite its flaws. The History thus offers an alternative for considering the politics of hope, one that challenges
hope’s ardent proponents today.

I

n the midst of Thucydides’ infamous ‘‘Melian
Dialogue,’’ hope is characterized as ‘‘danger’s
comforter.’’ The Athenians tell the Melians:
Hope, danger’s comforter, may be indulged in by
those who have abundant resources, if not without
loss at all events without ruin; but its nature is to be
extravagant, and those who go so far as to put their
all upon the venture see it in its true colours only
when they are ruined. (5.103)1

There is a remarkable ambiguity in elpis kindun!
oi
paramuthion, the Greek here translated as ‘‘hope,
danger’s comforter.’’ This begins with ‘‘elpis,’’ which
can mean ‘‘expectation’’ as well as ‘‘hope,’’ suggesting
that hope can come in degrees of strength, ranging
from distant, forlorn hopes to reasonable confidence
(Myres 1949). This ambiguity is borne out by
Thucydides’ treatment, where elpis vacillates between
the well-grounded hopes of the Peloponnesians in
their navy (2.89) to the fanciful, ridiculous hopes of
Nicias for victory in Sicily when his forces lie in
shambles (7.77). Paramuthion, moreover, doubles
down on this ambiguity: it can take the sense of an
exhortation or stimulant as well as an assuagement or
abatement. Thus Lattimore (1998) translates this
passage as ‘‘incitement to danger’’ (297) while Jowett

(1881) offers ‘‘good comforter in the hour of danger.’’
The rest of this passage conveys the multiple meanings
of hope in ‘‘danger’s comforter’’: hope appears as a
comfort and as an indulgence, as potentially dangerous even to the powerful, as a cause of loss, and as
by its very nature extravagant such that it inevitably
leads to ruin.
Despite the rich ambiguities of elpis and its role
in Thucydides’ History,2 scholars have paid scant
attention to its overarching significance. Over a century ago, Cornford ([1907] 1969) offered the most
thorough account of elpis in the History, arguing that
Thucydides abandoned Aeschylean theology but retained this theology’s moral elements by conferring
‘‘supernatural powers’’ to entities such as Elpis. On
Cornford’s account, then, Elpis has a life independent
from the actors she influences; standing apart from
human concerns, Elpis can delude or appropriately
encourage. A few generations later, Stahl countered
Cornford’s reading by maintaining that Thucydides
approaches these matters not from the divine but
from the human angle: ‘‘Unlike these earlier, mythrelated approaches, Thucydides analyzes the old
problem in exclusively human terms’’ ([1966] 2003,
190). Since Stahl’s shift to a human-focused reading,

1
Crawley translation, revised by Strassler in Strassler (1996). All quotations of Thucydides comes from this edition unless otherwise
indicated. All Greek citations come from the Oxford Classical Text (Jones and Powell 1942).
2

I will refer to Thucydides’ text by its conventional name of the History.
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elpis has gone largely unnoticed in the literature on
Thucydides.3
Returning to the grounds for Cornford and Stahl’s
differences, this essay argues that the ambiguity of
Thucydides’ richly complex account of elpis does not
preclude bringing together the two poles of previous
interpretation but rather suggests a way of viewing the
work of the History as a whole. Moreover, I argue that
this examination of elpis in the History can inform
reflection about hope’s place in political theory and
hope’s significance for politics more generally. Today,
hope has become a nearly unquestioned ideal for
many political commentators and actors from all parts
of the political spectrum in the United States, ranging
from Ayn Rand to Christopher Lasch to Richard Rorty
to President Barack Obama (Rand [1957] 1996; Lasch
1991; Rorty 1999; Obama 2006).4 As Delbanco has
shown, much of this discourse of hope dates from the
Christian stories used to interpret the founding of the
American republic. While its transcendent sources
have arguably disappeared, hope remains a powerful
and yet rarely questioned stimulus for political life, the
source of ‘‘the real American dream’’ (Delbanco 1999).
At a time when hope is ascendant and admired
in political discourse, then, this essay is offered as an
intervention: Thucydides’ strangely ambivalent account presents a counterpoint to the infrequently
qualified embrace of hope today.5 Tracing hope in
Thucydides’ text reveals bases for both Cornford
and Stahl’s accounts of hope as, at turns, delusive
and dangerous as well as constructive and necessary.
The History thus offers grounds for criticizing hope
while also delineating its positive and constructive
side. After detailing hope in the History, I contrast
its account of hope with the recent arguments of
Jonathan Lear, showing how hope deludes political
leaders and communities into destructive behavior
even while it provides the ultimate bulwark against
despair—and thus often the basis for a community’s
3

More recent studies have largely ignored hope, although with
favorable citations of Stahl (see, e.g., Connor 1984 and Orwin
1998). The present essay owes its inspiration to the provocative
paragraph on hope in Geuss (2005, 224).
4
In addition to Christianity, hope in American pragmatism has
influenced contemporary discourse (Westbrook 2005); according
to Kloppenberg (2011), Barack Obama’s hope combines elements
from both pragmatism and Christianity.
5

The account of hope in the History is cogent on its own, but it
also offers a noneschatological treatment of hope absent from
traditions of hope within both Christianity and Marxism. Thucydides’ History can thus lay a groundwork for reconstructing hope
without such a philosophy undergirding it. For a metaphysical and
religious reconstruction of hope with some critical treatment of
Thucydides’ ‘‘negation’’ of hope, see Mittleman (2009).
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survival. Thucydides goes farther than Lear, moreover, by taking up the text’s ambiguous account of
hope and educating judgments about any politics
informed or inspired by hope. A politics reconsidered
in light of Thucydides’ treatment of hope, in contrast
to today’s political valorization, chastens any hopeful
politics, facing hope with the stark reality of the
History’s narrative even while showing the enduring
need and value for hope in times of despair and crisis.
The resulting hope allows for and even demands dark
and difficult conclusions; Thucydides’ History suggests
how we might nonetheless bear up, with appropriate
judgment and hope for change and survival.6

Hopeful Delusions
In recent American political discourse, hope has been
only rarely criticized; in contrast, Thucydides’ account
of the rise and fall of Athens presents an argument
against hopeful politics that spans the entire book.7
Crane (1998) has suggested that Thucydides’ text seeks
to replace the older heroic ethic with a rationalized
version of ‘‘ancient simplicity,’’ and examining elpis8
in the History suggests that taken in the terms of this
project, hope is on its way out. To put the apparent
argument briefly: as an individual and collective
phenomenon, hope can serve to blind human beings
to reality, deluding them into believing that their
wildest fantasies might come true and that what lies
beyond reach is easily attainable. Hope comforts
danger in the sense that it attends it; a hope-fueled
politics is a dangerous and self-destructive politics.
From the beginning of the History, hope appears
in descriptions of the Athenians; the critique of hope
focuses above all on their conduct during the conflict.9
6
In addition to the literature mentioned above, three useful and
recent studies of Thucydides have informed the present essay,
although none discusses hope: Zagorin (2008); Zumbrunnen
(2008); and Mara (2009).
7

This reading of hope largely corresponds to Orwin’s (1998, 201)
infrequent treatment of the concept, arguing as he does that hope
and longing mediate human experience, shrinking the realm of
choice and free action.
8
For ease of reading, I will refer to elpis as hope in the rest of this
essay. It is important to note, however, that elpis imbues a
meaning to hope different from the familiar and conventional
sense in English.
9
In what follows, I focus on hope in the case of the Athenians as
contrasted primarily with their subject allies. There are other
worthwhile non-Athenian discussions of hope, such as that of
Hermocrates and the Syracusans, but for reasons of length I will
have to treat these examples elsewhere.

thucydides, hope, politics
Here are the Corinthians describing the Athenians in
Book I:
And again, they are adventurous beyond their power,
and daring beyond their judgment, and in danger
they are sanguine, . . . The deficiency created by the
miscarriage of an undertaking is soon filled up by
fresh hopes; for they alone are enabled to call a thing
hoped for a thing got, by the speed with which they
act upon their resolutions. (1.70)

The Athenians, in other words, live in constant hope
because they can achieve everything they hope for.
Unlike the plodding Spartans, the Athenians leap
forward with their ingenuity, innovation, and constant activity. They have, as Pericles puts it in his first
speech, many reasons to hope for favorable outcomes
(1.144).
This passage also anticipates the important ambivalence about hope that pervades Thucydides’
History, presaging the critique of hope as well as a
second, constructive account of hope that I discuss
below. Seeking to persuade the Spartans to ally
against the Athenians, the Corinthians emphasize
the power of hope and how, when matched by
capabilities, hope can lead to great success. Directly
addressing the Spartans, the Corinthians contrast the
Spartans’ procrastination with the Athenians’ promptitude, saying that ‘‘they [the Athenians] hope by
their absence to extend their acquisitions, [while] you
fear by your advance to endanger what you have left
behind’’ (1.70). Hope drives the Athenians to overlook pragmatic considerations while their constant
activity makes up for these speculative excesses. In
other words, the Corinthians’ praise for Athens
includes an appreciation of how effective hope is
for the Athenians and how harmful to their enemies.
On the other hand, the Corinthians’ account of
the hopeful Athenians also foreshadows the conflict
to which Thucydides devotes the History, and in
retrospect the arc of the History casts these depictions
in a much more negative light. While the narrative of
the Athenians’ own hopes does not peak until Melos
and the Sicilian Expedition, the problems of hope
appear earlier, enunciated by Diodotus in the Mytilenian Debate. The Athenians have questioned their
earlier resolution to execute the whole adult male
population of Mytilene, making slaves of the women
and children, and Thucydides has given us the
speeches of Cleon and Diodotus as contrasting arguments against and for a change in decision. Cleon
argues that the Athenians must hold out ‘‘no hope’’
(oukoun . . . elpida, 3.40) to the Mytilenians; however,
Diodotus responds with a more complex point that
the hope of allies and confederates against the
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Athenians will always remain, contradicting Cleon’s
insistence on the deterrent power of punishment.
Diodotus claims that ‘‘hope leads men to venture;
and no one ever yet put himself in peril without the
inward conviction that he would succeed in his
design’’ (3.45). He continues:
Hope also and love [er!
os], the one leading and the
other following, the one [er!
os] conceiving the attempt, the other [elpis] suggesting the facility of
succeeding, cause the widest ruin, and, although
invisible agents, are far stronger than the dangers
seen. (Ibid.)10

As Stahl comments, the blindness of hope does not
describe an isolated phenomenon, but ‘‘a universal
(if regrettable) fact about the human condition,’’ a
constant of inconstancy created by hope’s suggestions
to erotic desire ([1966] 2003, 186).
The appearance of er!
os is important here and
suggests how passions serve to foment the pathologies of hope that Thucydides’ History criticizes. While
hope leads, making success seem easy, er!
os conceives
the attempt, inflaming hope, one might say, by
seeding it with erotic energy. This idea that hopes
become delusional when twinned with passions
reappears in the Pylos episode, which occurs the year
after Mytilene. Here a desire for more (pleonexia)
accompanies hope, creating a destructive and ravenous hope in the Athenians, one that is reinforced as
ruinous in the narrative.11 After the Spartans suffer a
surprising defeat at Pylos, they approach the Athenians
seeking to settle the war. Warning against one possible
response, the Spartans presage the Athenians’ eventual
path, declaring that they are ‘‘led on by hope to grasp
continually at something further, through having
already succeeded without expecting it’’ (4.17).While
the Spartans point to their own fall from greatness,
which has led to the reversal at Pylos, the Athenians
fail to recognize themselves in the travails of their
enemy and thus to countenance the contingency of
their present successes. Instead, the Spartan diagnosis
of the Athenians’ hopeful grasping after more proves
accurate when the Athenians reject the Spartan
requests for peace (4.21). Pleonexia inflates the
Athenians’ hopes and beclouds their judgment,

10
Here I modify the Crawley/Strassler translation, which translates
er!
os as ‘‘greed.’’ ‘‘Greed’’ may call attention to the inflationary
pressures exerted by human passions more generally, connecting
er!
os to the use of pleonexia that follows.
11

Balot (2001) defines pleonexia as ‘‘an excessive desire to get
more, not simply acquisitiveness as such, which, depending on
how ‘acquisitiveness’ is understood, might refer merely to natural
or necessary desires to get more’’ (28, n. 16).
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deluding the Athenians about the reality of the
situation. To underscore the point, a similar motif
appears at the end of the episode when the Athenians
refuse the Spartans’ requests to recover their prisoners:
‘‘The Athenians, however, kept grasping for more,
and dismissed envoy after envoy without their having
effected anything’’ (4.41).
Hope, ‘‘danger’s comforter,’’ can operate to
deceive the powerful, even those like the Athenians
who once thrived upon well-grounded hopes. In the
eighth year of the war, another incident underscores
the destructive power of hope, connecting the Mytilenian episode with the Athenians after Pylos. Sparta
has just captured Amphipolis, an Athenian colony.
The tides of the conflict have begun to shift. Other
cities subject to Athens, hearing of the capture and of
the generous terms given to the city, feel strongly
encouraged to change their condition and revolt. The
narrator comments on the episode that ‘‘it is a habit
of mankind to entrust to careless hope what they long
for, and to use sovereign reason to thrust aside what
they do not want’’ (4.108).12 Here the subject allies
of Athens fall prey to hope’s deceptions, stoked by
their longing for freedom: wanting to escape subjection to the Athenians, desire deludes these cities
into believing that they could resist, if not defeat the
Athenians. As Stahl puts it: ‘‘Even in the face of his
own destruction, man refuses to recognize the reality
of the situation . . . instead he flees into unreality, or
better: into a world of fantasy produced by his own
wishes’’ ([1966] 2003, 166). The subsequent massacre of the Melians shows just how deadly such
fantasies—the lethal wages of hope—can be.
While the History illuminates the widely destructive consequences of hope, Athens remains the
representative case. As the conflict continues, the
course of the Athenians’ hopes becomes clearer, and
these hopes facilitate the catastrophe of Sicily; hope’s
inexorable logic appears most strikingly in Books VI
and VII, dedicated almost entirely to activities
around the Athenian expedition to Sicily.13 The
History had already prepared its readers to associate
excessive hope with this expedition during an earlier
Athenian sally to Sicily. When that misadventure
failed and the Athenians banished two of its unsuccessful generals, Pythodorus and Sophocles, while
fining a third, Eurymedon, the narrator remarks that
12

I modify the Crawley/Strassler here by rendering epithumousin
as ‘‘want’’ in the second instance instead of ‘‘desire.’’ (There is
one Greek verb of wanting in this sentence, but because of a
parallel formation Crawley/Strassler translates it twice.)
13

On hope in Books VI and VII, see Avery (1973).

joel alden schlosser
the ‘‘extraordinary success’’ in the past led the Athenians
to ‘‘confuse their strengths with their hopes’’ (4.65). The
Corinthians had characterized the Athenians as always
achieving what they hoped for, but the very success of
their hopefulness now leads to a confusion between
what was possible on the basis of their strengths and
what was impracticable and exceeded their means.
Hope becomes the basis for all future calculations,
enlisting ‘‘sovereign reason’’ as its handmaid. These
hopes bear bitter fruit in the Sicilian Expedition.
The Sicilian Expedition begins and ends with hope,
and Thucydides’ chronicle of these years illuminates
what makes the Athenians’ hope pathological. Once
the Athenians resolve to sail to Sicily, first enraptured
by the tales of wealth and power spun by envoys from
Egesta, the preparations grow to epic proportions.
Nicias’ strategy to exaggerate the expedition’s size
results in even more accumulation, and the vastness
and magnificence of the mission make everyone ‘‘fall
in love with the enterprise.’’ This desire in place,
hopes reach beyond their grounds, as the Athenians
regard their navy before embarking:
Indeed the expedition became not less famous for its
wonderful boldness and for the splendor of its
appearance, than for its overwhelming strength as
compared with the peoples against whom it was
directed, and for the fact that this was the longest
passage from home hitherto attempted, and the most
ambitious in its objectives considering the resources
of those who undertook it [epi megist!ei elpidi t!
on
mellont!
on pros ta huparchonta epecheir!eth!e]. (6.31)

Here the Crawley/Strassler translation obscures the
hopes of the passage. As Thomas Hobbes translates
the final phrase: ‘‘for that it was undertaken with so
vast future hopes in respect of their present power’’
(Hobbes 1975, 406). These ‘‘vast hopes’’ (megist!ei
elpidi) assure the Athenians of their success despite
the magnitude of the undertaking or their ignorance
of Sicily; inflated to grand proportions by erotic
desire, their hopes exceed the Athenians’ resources.
As Parry comments, this passage emphasizes ‘‘the
divergence between perception and reality’’ characterizing Athenian policy after Pericles (1981, 18).
Their delusive hope blinds them to the perils of the
enterprise; hope comforts its dangers, not inciting but
smothering them so that these lovers can forget the
dangerous path they have chosen.
Hope also accompanies the Athenians to Sicily,
where its deceptions become ever clearer. Once the
expedition begins to sour, hope reappears—but now
divorced from the erotic or pleonectic passions that
had invigorated it earlier. Nicias sees the strength of
the enemy and his own difficulties increasing daily
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(7.8). He writes a letter to Athens, wishing to report
the truth and insure that the Athenians should know
his opinion and the real facts. Yet his letter brings
unhappy news: ‘‘the besieger in name has become . . .
the besieged in reality’’ (7.11). The Syracusans and
their allies soon defeat the Athenians, destroying those
‘‘great hopes’’ (7.75) and forcing the Athenians to
confront an unkind reality. The dead unburied, the
army in shambles, the dreams deflated: the Athenians,
once high on hope, have now ridden it to its nadir.
But hope does not entirely disappear, and soon we
see that Nicias’ foolish hopes are tied to an inflexible
piety that deludes his hopes. As the situation worsens,
Nicias tells the Athenians to ‘‘hope on’’ as they attempt
to retreat; his words sound much like the Melians’:
I have . . . still a strong hope for the future, and our
misfortunes do not terrify me as much as they might.
Indeed we may hope that they will be lightened: our
enemies have had good fortune enough; and if any of
the gods was offended at our expedition, we have
already been amply punished. (7.77)

Now piety inflames the hopes of Athens’ leaders, as
Nicias has no place to put his hopes but in the justice
of the gods. Like er!
os and pleonexia before, piety
diverts hope from its connection to reality, placing
hope’s object beyond the next horizon. The underlying
logic remains the same: hopes thus inflated prove
delusive, and Nicias’ undoing clearly stems from his
ill-conceived hope. As if to echo the Melians’ fate, the
hopes of Nicias and the Athenians will come to
naught. Some will be butchered in the Assinarus River
as they try to escape while others will die of exposure
in the quarries of Syracuse. Nicias and his fellow
general Demosthenes will be summarily executed.
When news reaches Athens of the disaster in Sicily
the Athenians react with anger and rage at the orators, reciters of oracles, and soothsayers, all of whom
‘‘encouraged them to hope that they should conquer
Sicily’’ (8.1). Fear and consternation follow, and the
disorder of Book VIII charts the hapless course of a
city where hope has crashed against reality’s shoals.
While the Athenians live on, eventually finding some
moderate course in the mixed regime (8.97), they are
changed—hope does not return, and one wonders if
the Corinthians’ praise of successful Athenian hopefulness in Book I could ever be heard again.14

14

Book VIII presents an interesting case study of how the
Athenians proceed once disabused of their hopes, that is, how
a polity proceeds once hope appears to be totally crushed. As I
note, they survive, but it’s not clear that the Athenian vitality that
led to their stunning achievements persists. I hope to address
these questions in future work.
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Desperate Hope
This critique of hope would seem to point to an
outright rejection of hope. Indeed, Ehrenreich (2007)
has recently identified the ‘‘pathologies of hope’’
along very similar lines precisely in order to dismiss
hope entirely. Because hope so quickly becomes a
kind of delusional positive thinking, one that clings
to illusions of redemption while implicitly denying a
solution to the original problem, Ehrenreich argues
that we would do better without hope. Situations of
crisis in particular, Ehrenreich points out, are better
faced without the potentially delusive power of hope:
cancer patients (like herself ) cannot let hope fool
them just as airplane pilots must prepare for the
worst when an engine malfunctions; hope alone will
save neither. In response to Jesse Jackson’s ‘‘keep
hope alive,’’ Ehrenreich responds: ‘‘Fuck hope. Keep
us alive.’’
Unlike Ehrenreich’s polemic, however, Thucydides’ History does not reject hope. While readers of
Thucydides have almost all followed Stahl’s account
of a Thucydidean critique of hope, this reading risks
missing the constructive aspect of hope in the
History. I will focus on three moments suggesting a
second story for hope in the History: first, the hopes
of Nicias, prior to their inflammation with piety;
second, the hopes of the Melians as they faced the
Athenians; and third, the hopes of the Athenians a
generation before in their conflict with the Persians.
While the story of hope in the History thus far
illuminates its destructive comfort in political projects of overreaching, these moments suggest a second
account of hope that complicates the first by showing
the need for desperate hope, that is, for hope as
the final bulwark against despair. If the first story of
hope harshly depicts its implication in dangerous
delusions, this second contrasts it positively with the
hopelessness that comes from resignation.
While Nicias appears to present a case study of
delusive hopes fueled by excessive piety, the portrait
in the History is more ambiguous than that. This is
not to deny the critique of hope evident in the
treatment of Nicias but rather to supplement this
critique with a constructive moment that dovetails
with similar moments elsewhere in the text. Viewing
Nicias as simply another example of the critique
of hope detailed in the first section does not
adequately explain Nicias’ valiant, albeit ultimately
unsuccessful, effort against the Syracusans. While
Connor (1984, 203) has suggested that Nicias’ invocation of hope must appear ironic given the Athenians’
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own condemnation of hope in their ‘‘dialogue’’ with
the Melians, the narrator’s final praise of Nicias after
his death, that Nicias, who ‘‘least deserved such a fate’’
led a life ‘‘regulated with strict attention to excellence
[aret!e],’’15 gives reason to question any complete
dismissal of Nicias and his hopes. We must also
remember that Nicias’ hopes were not originally
baseless. While Demosthenes urged Nicias to withdraw, Nicias’ hopes were grounded in information
about the Syracusans’ weakening position (7.48).
From the beginning, Nicias fought against bad odds
and he very nearly won, as the narrator notes (7.2).
Only the unexpected and last-minute arrival of
Gylippus with reinforcements from the Peloponnesus,
which the narrator describes as a lucky occurrence,
changes the situation such that hope would begin to
appear delusive (7.2). Nicias’ hesitation to retreat,
which was only later exacerbated by his addiction to
oracles, stemmed from a realistic assessment of the
field of operations. His exhortations to hope (7.61,
7.77), then, carry the grounded hopes of a general
struggling to stave off his troops’ despair; only in
hindsight can we judge them as also being inflated by a
delusive piety—and this is a partial judgment. Nicias
faced a desperate situation and had already pled for
permission to withdraw. The ‘‘great hopes’’ of the
expedition had disappeared (7.75); in their absence
the Athenians needed some alternative to despair and
the total loss that would come with resignation. That
alternative required hope.
Nicias presents one example of hope as not
entirely delusive; the Melians provide another. The
Melians’ insistence that as long as they had life they
had hope, and that consenting to the Athenians’
subjugation would extinguish both life and hope,
may first appear foolhardy (and thus as an example of
the original critique of hope), but close attention to
their language suggests otherwise:
But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes
more impartial than the disproportion of numbers
might lead one to suppose; to submit is to give
ourselves over to despair, while action still preserves
for us a hope that we may stand erect. (5.102)

Here it is not the case that the Melians put their hopes
solely in salvation from the gods or the Spartans;
instead, part of their hope is more basic. Despair
would mean giving up to what appears as inevitable;
the Melians, in contrast, assert hope as the only means
of survival. As was the case for Nicias, hope here
15

I modify the Crawler/Strassler here to render aret!e as ‘‘excellence’’
rather than ‘‘virtue,’’ which is their translation.

describes an expression of human longing against
seemingly insurmountable odds that might otherwise
condemn the sufferer to resignation. The Athenians
assume that subjection would not entail too much of a
sacrifice and that the Athenian empire would preserve
Melos while preserving itself. Yet the so-called dialogue also indicates the degree of coercion the Athenians exert: they reject the Melians’ desires to remain
neutral; they forbid the Melians from discussing
justice; and they scoff at the Melians’ respect for
tradition and the gods. In other words, the Athenians
demand that the Melians become Athenians—or even
worse than Athenians since the Melians will not
receive citizenship and must pay tribute. Given the
degree of transformation the Athenians demanded, the
Melians’ hope was indeed the only possible response if
they wished to maintain any sense of national integrity.
Moreover, the History offers reasons to question
an interpretation of the Melians’ hope as entirely
delusive. While the Athenians deride the Melians for
their hopes, appearing confident that they will easily
quash them (5.115), this oversimplifies a complicated
situation.16 Upon being rebuked by the Melians, the
Athenians commence hostilities, building a wall
around the Melians and besieging them. But the
Melians counter, attacking during the night and
stealing provisions from their assailants. The next
winter the Athenians had still not crushed the
Melians, and the Melians again take part of the
Athenian lines. Only when Athenian reinforcements
arrive, perhaps freed by the Spartans’ decision not to
invade the Athenians’ ally, the Argives, and with a
betrayal from within the Melian camp do the Melians
surrender. If not for these contingencies, both on
Melos and abroad, the Melians might well have
emerged alive. While one could not claim that their
hopes were realistic, the Melians’ hopes (like Nicias’
in Sicily) still very nearly came true. The odds were
heavily stacked against the Melians, but the History’s
accounts of human affairs are too complex and
searching to allow for claims of certainty about
human action; hope finds a place in the never-closed
crevasses of possibility when despair (and with it,
self-annihilation) appears to be the only alternative.
The examples of Nicias and the Melians also
hearken back to a third moment in Thucydides’
narrative that further supports the constructive story
of hope poised against despair. In their war against
the Persians, the Athenians had also had the chance
to make their peace and submit—first in response to
16

I thank Kinch Hoekstra for his insightful suggestions about the
arguments in this paragraph.
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an offer from Darius and then with Xerxes. When
Xerxes neared and their allies temporized, it looked
as if the Athenians should capitulate. While the
Peloponnesians remained safe at home, the Athenians
were under mortal threat, just like the Melians. But
the Athenians refused to surrender.17 Here are the
Athenians at the assembly in Sparta years later,
explaining themselves:
We left behind us a city that was a city no longer, and
staked our lives for a city that had an existence only
in desperate hope, and so bore our full share in your
deliverance and in ours. (1.74)

With their polis only surviving in ‘‘desperate hope,’’
the Athenians still fought and won at Salamis, joining
their allies to defeat the Persians. Rather than
succumbing to despair, as would the Athenians after
the Sicilian disaster (8.1), here the Athenians bear up
with hope. Hope inspires their valiant and successful
resistance, creating the very possibility that Themistocles can lead them to victory. Nicias and the
Melians were crushed, but hope helped the Athenians
to persevere at Salamis. Hope against the Persians
sustained the Athenians—it maintained the image of
their city when nothing else remained and provided
the basis for the Athenian victory.
Taken together, these three moments of constructive desperate hope—Nicias on Sicily, the Melians
against the Athenians, and the Athenians at Salamis—
cannot outweigh the ruinous hopes that culminated
in the Sicilian expedition in the first place. The
overarching, primary account of the text points to a
condemnation of hope for its susceptibility to delusion and destructive political consequences.18 But if
hope tends toward excess, it also appears to sustain
existence on the brink of despair. Even if it cannot
guarantee success, hope appears necessary as a support
for continued life. These moments thus contradict a
total dismissal of hope’s connection to successful
political action and complicate the conventional reading that Thucydides’ History presents a monological
critique of hope.
The fragility of these constructive moments of
hope, moreover, suggests reasons why some hopes
succeed while others fail. These reasons begin to
appear in Pericles’ two speeches around the plague,
17

Euben (1977, 45) also identifies this connection.
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where constructive hope and destructive hopes appear intertwined. In the Funeral Oration, hope takes
the positive angle noted by the Corinthians in Book I.
Pericles exhorts his fellow citizens to live with hope
for glorious remembrance through the continued life
of Athens: citizens can act with hope and die for
Athens because Athens will outlive them. Athens’
‘‘imperishable monuments’’ (2.41) allow her citizens
to commit ‘‘to hope the uncertainty of final success’’
and choose ‘‘to die resisting, rather than to live submitting,’’ fleeing only from dishonor and meeting
danger face to face (2.42). Athenian citizens thus die
as heroes immortalized by their city herself, exemplars
to the citizens still living:
These take as your model, and judging happiness to
be the fruit of freedom and freedom of valor, never
decline the dangers of war. For it is not the miserable
that would most justly be unsparing of their lives;
these have nothing to hope for: it is rather they to
whom continued life may bring reverses as yet
unknown, and to whom a fall, if it came, would be
most tremendous in its consequences. And surely, to
a man of spirit, the degradation of cowardice must be
immeasurably more grievous than the unfelt death
which strikes him in the midst of his strength and
common hope! (2.43)19

The hopes invested in the city give its individual
citizens reason to fight; without hope, they would
have no encouragement to face mortal dangers. The
hope of the Athenians, then, both of her citizens and
of the city herself, lies in continued life when reverses
can still come; hope is grounded in the empirical
reality of the polis, not in some distant object of
conquest or salvation by the gods. The desperate
hope against the Persians at Salamis has developed
into a hopeful democracy where the members of
the d!emos find strength for individual action in the
endurance of the d!emos as a whole beyond the bounds
of a single human life.
But the fragility of hope appears shortly after the
Funeral Oration with the advent of the plague; this
shows how even well-grounded hopes can fall in the
face of crisis or catastrophe and thus how no single
hope can guarantee success; the constructive side
appears always twinned with its destructive partner.
The vision that hope creates, a vision of having one’s
desires met indefinitely in the future, obscures
changes of fortune like the plague as well as those
unforeseen obstacles the Athenians will encounter as

18

And in this sense, the Athenians’ castigation of the Melians for
having groundless hopes is correct. The point remains, however,
that hope presents an ineluctable part of human motivation, both
for psychological reasons and because chance could always turn
the course of events. I thank one of my anonymous reviewers for
pushing this question.

19
The Crawley/Strassler translation obscures an important sense
by translating the final words of this passage, koin!es elpidos, as
‘‘patriotism.’’
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the war continues. The plague’s sudden outbreak
vanquishes the Athenians’ hopes:
By far the most terrible feature in the malady was the
dejection which ensued when anyone felt himself
sickening, for the despair into which they instantly
fell took away their power of resistance, and left them
a much easier prey to the disorder. (2.51)

The despair that hastens each individual’s death illuminates a broader point about Athens itself. Shattering
the vision of Athens’ immortality and continued life,
the plague makes any hope of survival ‘‘vain.’’ What
once created an infrangible foundation—the immortal
Athenian polity—now appears tenuous and fragile;
without this basis, hope dissipates just like the
‘‘ancient simplicity’’ replaced by ‘‘lawless extravagance’’
in the wake of the disease’s ravages (2.52). Without
hope, Athenians transform:
Men now did just what they pleased, cooly venturing
on what they had formerly done only in a corner,
seeing the rapid transitions produced by persons in
prosperity suddenly dying and those who before had
nothing succeeding to their property. So they resolved
to spend quickly and enjoy themselves, regarding their
lives and riches as alike things of a day. (2.53)

Perseverance, patience, piety: all these marks of hopefulness from Pericles’ Funeral Oration evaporate with
the pestilence. Even desperate hope offers no guarantee
of continued success—or life.
In his third and final speech, Pericles acknowledges that the plague exceeded the Athenians’ previous
hopes. Reversing course, Pericles now condemns hope,
viewing it as a resort for those without the resources to
confront fortune’s vacillations.
Where the chances are the same, knowledge fortifies
courage by the contempt which is its consequence, its
trust being placed, not in hope, which is the prop of
the desperate, but in a judgment grounded upon
existing resources, whose anticipations are more to
be depended upon. (2.62)

Trying to remind the Athenians that the foundations
of their former hopes remain—that Athens herself
persists despite the ruin of the plague—Pericles
connects the knowledge of Athenian strength to their
ability to withstand the present crisis. Judgment must
stand alongside hopes, as we have seen: judgment
about the reality of the situation and thus about the
chances for success or survival. Still, this judgment
can never be certain, and once the Athenians find
themselves in foreboding conditions, their hopes now
no longer have a place; they must solely rely on the
good judgment of Athens’ leaders. Pericles invokes
hope even as he criticizes it, naming what once was a

source of strength for the Athenians. Faced with
despair after the invasions of Attica and the plague,
the Athenians have lost all hope and their confidence
stands in shambles—yet hope remains poised to rise
again, for good or for ill. By his very mention of
hope, Pericles foreshadows Nicias’ pleas in Sicily. In
the face of despair hope once seemed the best course,
but this hope, like Nicias’, appears dwarfed by
looming circumstances. Nicias was executed; Pericles,
like those who fell into hopelessness upon becoming
ill, succumbs to the plague.

Thucydides and ‘‘Radical Hope’’
Thucydides’ uniquely ambivalent concept of hope
stands apart from nearly all of the invocations of
hope in today’s political discourse, save one: Lear’s
(2006) recent discussion of ‘‘radical hope.’’20 In this
work of ‘‘philosophical anthropology,’’ Lear recounts
the plight of the Crow tribe on the brink of cultural
devastation: as white settlers increasingly encroached
on their traditional land, as the buffalo population
dwindled, and as disease ravaged their youth, the
Crow faced the very real possibility of annihilation. In
the midst of these existential challenges, a Crow chief
named Plenty Coups announced a dream vision of
the Chickadee, a symbol of adaptability and learning,
and led the Crow people to a transformed existence.
The Crow gave up their old way of life and embraced
a completely new one. Lear calls the sources of Plenty
Coups’ strength and vision ‘‘radical hope,’’ and he
argues that this vision of hope can inform present
responses to crisis and catastrophe.
For Lear, Plenty Coups serves as a ‘‘witness to a
peculiar form of human vulnerability’’ when a way of
life collapses (6). In such situations, a people must
commit to a vision of goodness, a purpose in its
collective life, that transcends the self-understanding
of the moment. For Plenty Coups and the Crow, they
had to envision an existence without buffalo, without
the frequent wars in which Crow warriors distinguished themselves, and without the nomadic life
that sustained their rituals and other communal
practices. At such moments of imminent cultural
transformation or destruction, Lear identifies the
commitment to the possibility that from this disaster
something good will emerge as radical hope. Radical
hope thus ‘‘anticipates a good for which those who
have the hope as yet lack the appropriate concepts
20

Citations in the paragraphs that follow refer to this edition.
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with which to understand it’’ (104). Hope comes with
some recognition of the possibility of despair but
bears up against it. For Plenty Coups, radical hope
manifested itself in fidelity to his prophetic dream, a
dream that responded to the changed reality around
him and envisioned a yet undefined alternative.
Plenty Coups’ experience also speaks to a more general phenomenon for Lear, the ‘‘ontological vulnerability’’ that makes us human (50); radical hope
informed by good judgment of a threatening reality
constitutes the best possible response.
Lear’s account of ‘‘radical hope’’ sounds much
like the Athenians prior to Salamis or the Melians
standing up to the Athenians. Just as the Crow had
nothing else but hope, the Athenians forsook their
city in ‘‘desperate hope.’’ Thucydides’ account seems
to imply that the Athenians’ good judgment of their
circumstances at that moment led to the possibility
of their hope’s validation. Only later, when hope
inflated by er!
os or pleonexia or piety obstructed their
grasp of reality did the Athenians begin to err. At the
crucial moment, ‘‘radical hope’’ seems to describe the
Athenians’ strength to resist, holding the promise of
resistance, even when that resistance constitutes only
a desperate hope. While Nicias failed, Pericles succeeded; the Athenians redeemed their hopes against
the Persians, and the Melians nearly did so against
the Athenians.
Yet despite these similarities, Thucydides’ account
of hope also contrasts with Lear’s in three ways that
speak to the limitations of today’s hope-imbued politics. First, the History suggests that hope may depend
on maintaining certain parts of life despite the threat
to one’s existence. The Athenians cannot Medize;21 the
Melians too find the prospect of submitting to the
Athenians tantamount to self-destruction. Lear takes it
as self-evident that continued survival, no matter the
cost, beats annihilation. On Lear’s account, the Crow
and Plenty Coups never entertained fighting until the
last man fell. Thus hope for Lear becomes a panacea,
the key to survival regardless of the condition of that
future life. In fact, radical hope by definition cannot
envision any future life but hopes nonetheless for its
goodness. Put that way, the contrast with Thucydides’
accounts of hope could not appear in starker relief:
contrary to Lear, the History suggests the possibility of
hoping against such (‘‘radical’’) hope, of resistance
even when it appears entirely futile; for both the
Melians and the Athenians, capitulation would have
entailed something worse than defeat. Accepting the
21

That is, the Athenians cannot adopt the practices of the Medes
(and pay tribute to the Medes) while remaining Athenians.
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kind of cultural transformation Lear finds admirable
in Plenty Coups would subvert the very basis of hope
that emerges as constructive in Thucydides’ account.
To borrow from Honig, Lear’s hope puts ‘‘mere life’’
before ‘‘more life’’ (2009, 10–11); Thucydides’ History
leaves open the choice (if there is one) between the two.
Lear further ignores the potential dangers of
hope. If Plenty Coups and the Crow roughly parallel
the Athenians against the Persians, the History juxtaposes this hopeful resistance with the tragedy of the
Melians while also reminding its readers of the
pathologies of hope that haunted the Athenians after
Salamis: er!
os or pleonexia or piety can all fuel delusive
and ultimately destructive hopes. ‘‘Desperate hope’’
can lead to ruin as well as survival, and even those
hope aids risk pinning too much on hope, being led
by hope to potential disasters. Pericles’ well-judged
hope cannot predict or withstand the subsequent
plague. While Nicias maintains a vulnerable hope in
the direst of circumstances, he is guilty of holding
hope too long when he fails to come to grips with the
reality of his situation, instead infusing hope with
piety and leading the Athenians to ruin. By heroizing
hope through the character of Plenty Coups, Lear
ignores the possibility that hope may also play the
villain.
Finally, Lear denies the vulnerability of hope. For
Thucydides, hope is never far from despair and
always prone to fatal inflation by misplaced desire,
greed, or excessive piety. The narrative of the History
witnesses this complexity, as we have seen: ‘‘hope,
danger’s comforter,’’ contains its different meanings
that play out most notably in the rise and fall of the
Athenians. Hope does not always lead to the longedfor good Lear wants to believe it does; it may become
subverted, appropriated, twisted into something unbearable, or contrary to one’s most precious beliefs.
The contrast with Lear underscores the ambivalence concerning hope in Thucydides’ History. Hope
will not, as Lear seems to have it, always lead to a long
and happy life. The narrative of the History counsels
deep skepticism even as it recognizes the need for
hope. The resulting openness can educate judgment
about hope, even while warning against complete
confidence in these judgments. While it offers imaginative resources for understanding hope and its
relationship to politics, the History calls into question
the usefulness of such resources. Hope can inspire
political action and sustain communities through
catastrophe, yet it can also overwhelm apparently
sagacious judgments, swamping these same hopeful
communities. History too may prove feckless, as it
did for the Athenians in a world where words had lost
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their meaning. Nonetheless, as hope persists in today’s
political discourse, Thucydides’ History can provide a
useful reminder about hope’s complications, both its
necessity and its dangers: hope without assurance, a
precarious hope, hope as ‘‘danger’s comforter.’’

Thucydides’ Hopes
Returning to Thucydides’ text with Lear in mind also
suggests a further facet to Thucydides’ account of
hope lacking in contemporary accounts. While ‘‘hope’’
plays an important role in the descriptions within the
text, Thucydides also clues in his readers from the very
beginning of the work that hope in some form imbues
the act of making and writing the text itself. Here is the
first line of the History:
Thucydides, an Athenian, wrote the history of the war
between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, beginning at the moment that it broke out, and expecting
[elpisas] that it would be a great war, and more worthy
of relation than any that had preceded it.22

Here I follow the conventional translation of elpisas
as ‘‘expecting,’’ but given how wide-ranging and influential a role it will play in the text, elpis in this first
sentence must suggest a connection between the
expectations of the author and those expectations of
characters in the narrative moved by hope. Unlike
Herodotus, who begins his account of the Persian wars
with assertions of knowledge, Thucydides selects a
word that resonates with the hopes of the narrative.23
Moreover (and again unlike Herodotus), by writing a
contemporaneous history, Thucydides wrote without
being fully aware of the greatness of the events he
chronicled. While he had grounds for his hopes—the
material development of Athens and Sparta being the
most significant—there was no certainty, no way of
knowing for sure, that the events would merit his
treatment. The History presents itself, then, as a
hopeful act: it begins with only an expectation that
something will come of its being written, distributed,
and circulated; that it will prove not merely ‘‘an essay
22

I have modified the Crawley/Strassler translation to emphasize
the verb elpisas. Crawley/Stassler reads: ‘‘. . . and believing that it
would be a great war. . . .’’
23
In Herodotus’s first sentence, he ‘‘presents his research’’
(histori!es apodexis), which does not exactly equate to knowledge.
Later in the introductory section, however, Herodotus reasons
that he will examine both great and small powers because of his
knowledge that human prosperity never remains constant, using
the participle of epistamai (1.5.5). Thucydides, in contrast, uses
elpizdein to describe the war he chronicles.

which is to win the applause of the moment,’’ but ‘‘a
possession for all time’’ (1.22). This provides a way of
reading the writing of the History as saying something
about hope left unremarked in accounts such as Lear’s.
Unlike modern accounts, then, Thucydides’
History offers itself as a way of thinking about the
hopes it chronicles in its narrative. There is a connection between what Thucydides is doing as an
author and what he is describing as a historian, and
the former can help us further understand the latter.
Lear, as we saw, suggests that radical hope informed by
good judgment of a threatening reality constitutes the
best possible response to situations of crisis or emergency. Yet Lear says nothing about what this good
judgment looks like, that is, about how one can know
whether hope will lead to success or failure, survival or
annihilation. On what basis can one know to trust
prophets like Plenty Coups? How did the Athenians
justify their hopes against the Persians at Salamis and
how did this justification differ from the Melians’? In
contrast to Lear’s silence, Thucydides’ History articulates some criteria for making such judgments. As we
saw in the first and second sections, the History
illuminates how hope becomes deluded when inflated
by powerful passions; similarly, desperate hope seems
best—although still not impregnable—when grounded
in concrete realities, such as the stability of the
Athenian polis. These two themes suggest a basis for
understanding the hope of the History as a whole, a
hope articulated by the narrator’s description of the
text’s task as offering ‘‘an exact knowledge of the past
as an aid to understanding of the future’’ (1.22).
Connecting the stated project of the History with the
theme of hope as we have seen it develop, I would
suggest that the History is written in the hopes that
truthful history can inform judgment and, more
broadly, diminish the persistence of delusional overreaching led by hope. The grounding of this hope
exists in the text itself, written as a ‘‘possession for all
time’’ (1.22). At the same time, however, the narrative
of the History testifies again and again to the fragility
of hope and the ways in which knowledge proves
inadequate for deterring poor judgment or combatting
destructive passions. The work of the History is guided
by hope, we might say, but it remains a realistic hope
informed both by hope’s excesses and by the contingency and unpredictability of human affairs.
Thus while it begins with a prefiguration of
hope’s prominent place in the narrative, moments
in the History militate against the hope that truthful
history might matter. In other words, the hopes of
the History, like those it describes, are not obviously
destined for fulfillment. Indeed, the narrative of the
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History often demonstrates how little knowledge
affects the momentous decisions of the war: from
the bending of truths in the initial speeches by the
Corcyraeans and Corinthians to the knowing ignorance of the Athenians about basic geography when
they invade Sicily, other motivations—often animated by the same passions that inflate and delude
hope itself—overpower all judgment and the correct
use of knowledge. Moreover, the text’s motif of what
Connor calls ‘‘the subversion of logos’’ calls into
question the hope that language could conduce to
learning, that it could bridge historical and circumstantial differences and provide a way of avoiding the
mistakes of the past. Thucydides’ History does not
offer many examples of good judgment informed by
a clear-eyed assessment such as what it offers. When
‘‘words lose their meaning,’’ language and history
begin to contribute to the destructiveness of war
(Connor 1984, 244–45). Thucydides’ hopes appear to
be in vain.
The description of the plague puts the issues of
the History’s hopes in microcosm. Striking without
forewarning, the plague throws Athens into chaos.
Even the narrator of the History confesses powerlessness against it:
All speculation as to its origin and its causes, if causes
can be found adequate to produce so great a
disturbance, I leave to other writers, whether lay or
professional; for myself, I shall simply set down its
nature, and explain the symptoms by which perhaps
it may be recognized by the student, if it should ever
break out again. (2.48)

The History will ‘‘set down its nature,’’ but it makes
no promises about an antidote. Readers must confront the fact that little helped against the plague; one
could only pity those suffering the disease’s horrific
effects. As Connor comments: ‘‘the possibility of
predicting and controlling the future . . . erodes’’
(1984, 244).
Another episode later in the text gives further
support to this reading of the project of the History
as hopeless: the ‘‘history within a history’’ when the
narrator recounts the Harmodius and Aristogeiton
episode in Book VI.24 Here the narrative breaks off
from describing the hysteria in Athens following the
mutilation of the Hermae and the mock celebration
of the Mysteries in order to ‘‘show that the Athenians
are no more accurate than the rest of the world in
their accounts of their own tyrants and of the facts of
24
Connor (1984, 244–45) also discusses this episode, but I owe
thanks to Alex Stevens, my student in a seminar at Carleton
College, for calling it to my attention.
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their own history’’ (6.54). The reactions in 415 were
premised on a story widely credited in Athens: the
people of Athens had heard how oppressive the
tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons a century earlier
had become before it ended and that the Spartans
and not they the people nor Harmodius had put
down the tyranny; this belief had made the people
suspicious and prone to fearfulness. But while asserting some particular details as different, the excursus
on Harmodius and Aristogeiton in the History does
not challenge the overarching reasons for suspicion:
although the Athenians mistakenly considered the
entirety of Peisistratus’s tyranny as oppressive and
believed Hipparchus to have succeeded him (when
in fact Hippias was the eldest son), the tyranny did
in fact oppress the Athenians following Harmodius
and Aristogeiton’s plot and eventually the Spartans
and the exiled Alcmaeonidae did enter Athens and
deposed the tyranny (6.59). In other words, the
Athenians’ unease and suspicions were based on an
essentially correct story. Having the facts straight
would have done nothing to change their interpretation and dampen their fears. History—and the
History—seems feckless.
Yet the upshot of these examples notwithstanding, Thucydides’ insistent correction of the historical
record evinces a kind of fidelity to the facts—and
therewith to the truth—that is inherently hopeful;
this speaks to how the text seeks to educate judgments about hope. If we are to have a basis for
assessing our hopes, Thucydides seems to insist that
this basis must lie in understanding the reality of
the situation, and a detailed assessment of a given
situation can provide criteria for evaluating our
hopes. Thucydides’ assertions about writing for those
who desire to know exactly what happened (1.22.4)
in the whole of the History still stands. While the
truth may not have mattered during crucial episodes
in the History, one could say that Thucydides wrote
the History in the hopes of truth’s mattering. Despite
its overarching tone of pessimistic realism, the
History, then, is also a hopeful history: it approaches
human affairs with the hopes that it might inform
and improve them (through exact knowledge of the
past) even while offering reasons for doubting the
hopes with which it was written. While also giving
grounds for hopelessness with its repeated stories of
the fecklessness of history, by writing in the first
place, Thucydides forms a basis for hope in the
physical creation of the History itself. Much as
Pericles connected hope to the physical existence of
the Athenian polis, the History gives material shape to
its hopes by making an artifact meant to endure
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beyond the circumstances of its creation. As a kt!ema
es aei—a possession for all time—the History appears
to present itself as a text to be possessed and read and
circulated.25 By writing, Thucydides rejected despair;
the History constitutes its own desperate hope. In a
sense, the History suggests how to construct hope by
introducing a new foundation for hope in the textual
tradition it helped to initiate, tethering its hopes to a
narrative that illuminates hope (in all its complexity)
while propounding a hope chastened by its own
history through the text’s very existence.26

Thucydides, Hope, Politics
A nearly unquestioned discourse of hope persists
across American politics today, but a politics of hope
informed by Thucydides’ History can offer an alternative in two respects: with an ambivalent account of
hope, as we saw in the first and second sections, and
with the text’s own invocation of hope and education
of hopes, as we saw in the fourth section. Thucydides’
History thus both chronicles and educates hope: it
supplements its narrative account of how hope plays
an ambiguous role in political life by also speaking to
future actors in the hopes of deflating their hopeful
longings; moreover, the History also self-reflexively
shows the limits of all hopes, even the hope that
truthful history might ameliorate the excesses of
human nature. By way of conclusion, let me suggest
what politics might follow from these findings and
how a politics after Thucydides contrasts with the
political uses of hope today.
Returning to the contrast with Lear can orient us
to where Thucydides’ History might lead. Lear’s
politics of hope are conventionally élitist: Plenty
Coups acts as the beacon of hope, and Lear says little
about the rest of the Crow people. So too many of
today’s invocations of hope repeat this heroization of
the hope-bearing leader: witness Shephard Fairey’s
iconic image of candidate Barack Obama or even
Jesse Jackson’s mantra of ‘‘keep hope alive’’—a hope
vested in Jackson’s candidacy—during his 1988

25

Havelock (1982, 138) notes that kt!ema signified a transferable
possession, inferring that here it connotes a written volume
possessed by a reader. See also Yunis’s comments on Thucydides’
text as ‘‘written to be read’’ (2003, 189).

26

See the recent studies by Morrison (2006) and Greenwood
(2006) for more elaboration of the demands Thucydides’ text
made and makes on its readers and the interpretive communities
that might have followed.

presidential run. In these instances and others, hope
is borne by particular leaders who vow to unite their
followers and lead them to a promised land. The
disadvantages of the leader-driven politics that follow
this kind of hope go unmentioned: the possibility of
élite manipulation, an easily disillusioned d!emos, or
the lack of solid foundation for any hope in the first
place. All could lead these hopes not only to disappointment, but even to disaster. As leaders, Themistocles and Pericles stand apart from the rhetorical
use of hope, suggesting then a different accent to a
politics of hope informed by Thucydides. The ‘‘desperate hope’’ of the Athenians before Salamis leads to
success thanks in part due to Themistocles’ brilliant
leadership. Pericles’ invocations of hope in the History
place this hope not in himself or his leadership but
rather in the Athenian polis, its practices, and its
traditions. Contrast Fairey’s quickly commodified
poster with the Acropolis: the one has all the ephemerality of another charismatic leader; the other stands,
with all its aesthetic and political complexity, in the
words of the Funeral Oration, as one of Athens’
‘‘imperishable monuments . . .’’ (2.31.4). Moreover,
as the tide begins to turn against the Athenians,
Pericles rejects hope as the sole bulwark against
despair. In his third speech, as we saw, Pericles places
the knowledge and judgment that the Athenian
democracy possesses before hope. Thucydides’ History
thus offers both leaders as more complex counterpoints to the heroic portrayals of hopeful leadership
to be found in Lear and contemporary politics.
These complicated examples of leadership also
speak to the difficulties of pinning down any definable Thucydidean politics of hope on the basis of the
History. Thucydides’ History can speak to the problem of hope but it remains too complex to prescribe a
single solution. Neither Themistocles nor Pericles
embodies the perfect hopeful leader. Instead, for
every instance when hope seems necessary for political success, a pathology also threatens. The contrast
between the desperate hopes of the Athenians
against the Persians at the beginning of Thucydides’
chronicle, and the Athenians’ despair and chaos in
the wake of the Sicilian disaster by the History’s end,
frame the entire shape of hope. Miniature versions of
this larger form appear at moments in the text: the
hopefulness of Pericles’ fellow Athenians that evaporates with the plague, provoking wide-spread destruction of the Athenian way of life; the hopeful
resistance of the Melians that nearly saves them
before they succumb to death and enslavement; the
hopeful perseverance of Nicias that again carries him
through difficult circumstances until he fails to
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recognize the changing reality around him and relies
instead on piety. In each instance hope buoys these
actors until it sinks them.
Yet the History does offer its own hopes, and the
grounding of these hopes allows us to diagnose and
evaluate the politics of hope today. Hope is necessary,
as we have seen, but the History chastens all hopes with
the education its text offers. The moment of hope’s
shift from constructive to pathological turns on a
particular judgment: does this hope have empirical
grounds? Is this hope exaggerated by er!
os, pleonexia, or
some other passion or ideology (such as inflexible
piety)? The suggestion of the History seems to follow
Pericles’ contrast between knowledge and judgment
and hope as ‘‘the prop of the desperate.’’ With what
Nietzsche named as his ‘‘courage to face reality,’’ the
author of the History holds up the most precise,
detailed account of ‘‘the ways things are’’ as a counter
to the hopeful delusions around him. Standing on the
facts (and nothing else) even when the facts appear not
to matter, such as with his correction of the Athenians’
false beliefs concerning Harmodius and Aristogeiton,
Thucydides takes his place with what Karl Rove
reportedly (and disparagingly) called ‘‘reality-based
communities’’ (Susskind 2004). Thucydides’ History
chronicles but ultimately rejects the attempts of the
powerful to remake the world and instead insists on
the undeniable power of reality itself and our ability to
scrutinize and represent that reality with some degree
of veracity. The Athenians’ ignorance about Sicily
prior to the invasion is a lamentable example of the
kinds of delusions hope spawns, delusions that Thucydides sought to correct. So too today’s foreign policy
blunders suffer from a lack of empirical realism and
are deluded by inflammatory passions.
Still, Thucydides’ History does not promise
answers. ‘‘Empirical realism’’ may sound too much
like a prescription for success, one that ignores the
sense of loss and practical aporia that pervades the
History: in the response to the plague at Athens, for
example, or in the vivid and tragic description of
the Athenians’ being slaughtered in Syracuse. To put
it another way, the ambiguity of the hope of the
Melians—with which this essay began—remains.
Their hope may well have been pathological, especially
if one places the greatest weight on their demise. Yet as
we have seen, details and contexts militate against this
reading: through the contrast with the Athenians as
they near the apex of their hope-driven exploits, the
Melians appear much more realistic, more grounded
in a clear-eyed assessment of the necessity of resistance; similarly, the uncertainty about what ‘‘survival’’
for the Melians would have entailed complicates this
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still further. The Melians could have survived, but for
some bad luck both external and internal to their
particular circumstances; their hopes may well have
been vindicated by success. In the same vein, Lear
overlooks how Plenty Coups’ Crow may have gone the
way of the Melians; ‘‘radical hope’’ always exists on a
precipice between success and utter failure.
Thus while focusing its readers on the need for
good judgment, Thucydides’ History also educates
these judgments for the shifting contexts and unavoidable uncertainties that characterize political
reality. Judgment and knowledge remain, for Thucydides, indefinite and subject to revision: standards for
a desirable outcome may shift, circumstances beyond
one’s control can change in an instant, and even the
motivations for action can transform as they unfold.
To follow hope in light of Thucydides means harnessing the necessary motivation for political success
while tempering this motivation with contextual
judgment and self-critical honesty.
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